CRITICAL: VMware vCenter Zero-Day CVE-2026-123890 Exploited by China-Nexus APT
Broadcom has patched CVE-2026-123890, a CVSS 9.8 unauthenticated authentication bypass in the VMware vCenter Directory Service that hands attackers an administrator@vsphere.local session. Google and Mandiant say the China-nexus group Armory Castle exploited it as a zero-day in September to forge SAML tokens, pivot to ESXi hosts, and steal data. No workaround exists.
There is a special kind of dread that comes with reading the words "vCenter" and "zero-day" in the same sentence. vCenter is the control plane for the entire virtualized data center, the box that can power off, snapshot, clone, or quietly copy every virtual machine you own. When an attacker owns vCenter, they don't own a server. They own the building. So it is worth taking a deep breath before reading this next part. Broadcom has patched a critical authentication bypass in VMware vCenter Server that a suspected China-nexus espionage group was exploiting more than two months before anyone outside the attacker's toolkit knew it existed.
The flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-123890 and carries a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8, with the vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. In plain English, that is network reachable, low complexity, no credentials, no user interaction, and total compromise. Broadcom published its advisory on November 19, 2026 and did not mince words, stating in the accompanying FAQ that the issue "qualifies under ITIL methodologies as an emergency change." A day later, Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant published a technical analysis tying in-the-wild exploitation to a group they track as Armory Castle, the actor formerly known as UNC5221, a name that should ring a bell for anyone who spent the last few years cleaning up after Ivanti Connect Secure intrusions.
What Actually Broke
The bug lives in the VMware Directory Service, the vmdird component that backs vCenter Single Sign-On. Mandiant describes it as "an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure vulnerability over Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Calls (DCE/RPC)." If that sentence made your eyes glaze over, here is the short version. SRP is a password authentication protocol designed so that the server never has to see your actual password. The whole point is that both sides derive a shared session key through some clever math. If the server leaks that session key to someone who never proved they knew the password, the cleverness is moot. According to Google, successful exploitation "results in a remote authentication bypass which creates an authenticated session established as administrator@vsphere.local." That is the master SSO account. There is no higher rung on the ladder.
The attack surface is TCP port 2012, which serves as the control interface RPC for vCenter SSO. That detail matters because port 2012 is not something most firewall rule sets think about. Teams that carefully restrict 443 and 5480 to an admin VLAN often leave everything else on the appliance reachable from wherever vCenter happens to sit, which is frequently a flat server network that every other appliance can talk to.
Broadcom says the vulnerability is present in vCenter 8.0, 9.0, and 9.1, along with the vCenter builds bundled inside VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, Telco Cloud Platform, and Telco Cloud Infrastructure. It is exploitable whether or not Enhanced Linked Mode is enabled. The fixed releases are vCenter 8.0 U3m, Cloud Foundation and vSphere Foundation 9.1.1.0200 and 9.0.2.0200, and Cloud Foundation 5.2.5 for the older 5.x line. Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure customers get their fix through vCenter 8.0 U3m. NVD's entry, published November 19, mirrors those version boundaries.
Now for the uncomfortable part. vSphere 7.0 left general support in October 2025, and Broadcom tells those customers to contact support for a patch under an extended support contract. If you are running 6.5 or 6.7, Broadcom no longer evaluates those versions at all and says they should be presumed vulnerable. There is no official workaround. When asked in the FAQ whether one exists, Broadcom answered "Not as listed by Broadcom," which is about as close as a vendor gets to saying "please just patch."
How Armory Castle Used It
What makes this campaign worth studying is that the vCenter zero-day was not the front door. Armory Castle got in first through a separate zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support, CVE-2026-102764 (CVSS 9.3), which CISA added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 16. From that foothold the group deployed a custom proxy tunneler called BARECLAW, moved laterally to an internal Linux appliance that had no EDR coverage, escalated to root, and started hunting for VMware infrastructure.
Mandiant recovered the reconnaissance commands, and they read like a checklist. The attackers ran nmap sweeps against internal subnets looking specifically for ports 443, 2012, 5480, 9080, and 389, along with the usual suspects like SSH and RDP. They were not wandering around. They knew exactly what a vCenter looks like on the wire, and they knew port 2012 was the one that mattered.
On that Linux appliance, the group dropped a pair of JSP web shells that Mandiant tracks as SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH, the first of which authenticates with the industrial strength password "123." From there came BONESAW, a Golang exploitation utility built around CVE-2026-123890. Google says BONESAW was used to exfiltrate the vmdird Lightning Memory-Mapped Database (the data.mdb file that holds the directory), hijack the SAML Security Token Service, and create a new SSO administrator account. A companion tool called SAWSNAKE, a Go port of the public vcenter_saml_login.py script, then used the stolen signing material to forge SAML tokens. That is a Golden SAML attack against vCenter, which means the attacker can impersonate any user and sail past MFA entirely because the identity provider itself has been cloned.
With administrator access in hand, Armory Castle created a local account named in the pattern sps-[redacted]@vsphere.local, enabled SSH on the appliance through a PUT request to the VAMI endpoint /rest/appliance/access/ssh, and logged in. They then pivoted to the ESXi hosts, mounted VMFS volumes, enumerated the file systems, and planted an SSH public key in root's authorized_keys file. Stolen data was archived and pulled back through the compromised Remote Support appliance over plain HTTP GET requests. For good measure, the group also deployed BEARBONES, a Dropbear-based SSH backdoor that logs plaintext credentials and listens on TCP 33992, and LAZYBONES, a lightweight Go backdoor that takes orders from a Slack channel. Mandiant previously saw LAZYBONES in an early 2025 intrusion that started with the Ivanti Connect Secure flaw CVE-2025-22457.
The timeline deserves attention. Exploitation took place in early September 2026, and the recovered BONESAW binary carries a build timestamp of July 13, 2026. That predates Broadcom's July 29 disclosure of CVE-2026-59309, an earlier 9.8-rated authentication bypass in the same Directory Service component. Build metadata can be faked, so take that with appropriate salt, but Google's own read is that BONESAW "was likely developed for broader operations." Translation: assume this was not a one-off tool built for a single victim.
This is also the second VMware zero-day Armory Castle has burned this year. CrowdStrike reported last month that the same crew abused CVE-2026-41709, a low-severity insufficient logging flaw in ESX, to shrink their audit trail. Google summed up the resourcing bluntly, noting that "the use of three separate specialized sets of malware and two zero-days in the course of a single campaign indicates that there are significant resources supporting Armory Castle operations."
What To Do Right Now
Patch. Broadcom's advisory is VMSA-2026-0009, and the fixed builds are listed above. A few operational notes will save you a bad evening. The updates are cumulative and cannot be installed through vCenter Quick Patch. Virtual machines keep running during the update, but management access drops briefly and some encryption operations against a Standard Key Provider become unavailable until vCenter returns. There is also a "Back-in-Time" trap for anyone mid-upgrade. Installing 8.0 U3m or 9.0.2.0200 will block a later move to VMware Cloud Foundation 9.1.1, so if you are headed there anyway, upgrade vCenter to 9.1.1 first and apply the security update on that branch, or wait for VCF 9.1.2.
While the change window is being scheduled, restrict network access to vCenter's management ports, and include TCP 2012 on that list. Only the systems that genuinely need to talk to vCenter should be able to reach it, and "everything on the server VLAN" does not count as a genuine need. Mandiant makes a sharp point here about the built-in VAMI firewall. It cannot scope rules to individual ports, it does not log denied connections, it ignores egress entirely, and anyone who compromises the VAMI on 5480 can simply turn it off. Mandiant recommends its VCSA Hardening and Logging Tool, which enforces a default deny posture with iptables at the Photon OS level and forwards connection logs to your SIEM. Test that in a lab first. Iptables mistakes on a vCenter appliance are an excellent way to meet your on-call rotation.
Patching closes the hole but does not evict anyone who already walked through it. Because exploitation predates the fix by more than two months, every vCenter in scope deserves a compromise assessment. Review the SSO directory for administrator accounts you did not create, especially anything resembling the sps-prefixed naming pattern. Check whether SSH was enabled on the appliance and when, and look for PUT requests to /rest/appliance/access/ssh in VAMI logs. On ESXi hosts, audit root's authorized_keys file. On any Linux appliances adjacent to vCenter, look for the file indicators Google published, including ActiveSer.jsp, u.jsp, /tmp/123, /tmp/sss, /tmp/dbr, and /usr/bin/vmtoolscs, and check for anything listening on TCP 33992 that you did not put there. Google also released YARA rules for all six malware families, and outbound connections to slack.com from a Linux appliance that has no business chatting on Slack should raise eyebrows on their own.
If you find evidence of BONESAW or SAWSNAKE, patching is the least of your work. The STS signing certificate must be treated as stolen, which means rotating it, and every token the attacker could have forged must be treated as valid until that rotation is complete. If you run BeyondTrust Remote Support, confirm you patched CVE-2026-102764 back in October and hunt there too, because that was the entry point in this case.
The broader lesson is one this industry keeps relearning. Attackers like Armory Castle target appliances precisely because those boxes rarely run EDR, rarely ship logs anywhere useful, and are treated as plumbing rather than as crown jewels. vCenter is not plumbing. It deserves the same identity controls, network segmentation, and log monitoring you give a domain controller, and arguably more, because a domain controller cannot power off every server you own with a single API call.
If an IT provider manages your systems
If your servers run on VMware vSphere, this flaw lets an attacker with no password take full control of every virtual machine you own. Attackers were using it for more than two months before a fix existed, and installing the patch will not remove someone who already got in.
- Are all of our vCenter servers on a fixed release such as vCenter 8.0 U3m, and what is the plan if we are still on vSphere 7.0 or older?
- Which systems can reach vCenter on our network, including TCP port 2012?
- Have you checked for SSO administrator accounts we did not create, or for SSH being turned on without our knowledge?
A good answer names the version you run, the date it was patched, and what the compromise check found. If they cannot confirm that check was done, or they find accounts or access they cannot explain, bring in incident response right away.
If you are an IT provider yourself, see how we partner with MSPs.
References
- Broadcom Security Advisory VMSA-2026-0009
https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/39495
- VMSA-2026-0009 FAQ and Guidance
https://github.com/vmware/vcf-security-and-compliance-guidelines/blob/main/security-advisories/vmsa-2026-0009/README.md
- Google Threat Intelligence, Armory Castle Exploits vSphere
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere
- NVD CVE-2026-123890
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123890
- The Hacker News, China-Linked Hackers Exploit Critical VMware vCenter Zero-Day
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/china-linked-hackers-exploit-critical.html
- The Hacker News, Critical VMware vCenter Zero-Day Flaw Lets Network Attackers Bypass Authentication
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/critical-vmware-vcenter-flaw-cvss-98.html
- CISA KEV, BeyondTrust Remote Support CVE-2026-102764
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
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