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Our Oil and Gas Company Got Hit and What Happens in the First Day

An oil and gas company was hit by a cyber attack. What the owner decides in the first day: the office-to-field boundary, who to call, preserving evidence and Texas rules.

By Mark Sullivan • Nov 21, 2026 •3 views
oil and gas cybersecurityincident responseFort WorthIT/OT boundary
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It is a weekday morning and your office manager calls to say nobody can open the accounting system. A few minutes later someone notices that the shared drive is full of files with strange new extensions, and a text file on the desktop says your data has been encrypted. If you run an oil and gas company, a production company, an oilfield service firm or a small midstream operation out of Fort Worth or anywhere else in North Texas, the next question is the one that keeps owners up at night. Is this just the office, or can it reach the field?

This post walks through the first day after an attack, in the order the decisions actually come up. It is written for the owner, the operations manager or the controller, not the IT person.

The First Hour Starts With One Question About the Boundary

Every oil and gas business has two networks, even if nobody ever drew them on a whiteboard. The first is IT, short for information technology, which is your business side. That is laptops, email, accounting, land and lease records, joint interest billing and the file server. The second is OT, short for operational technology, which is the equipment that measures and controls physical things. That includes the SCADA server, which is the central system that collects readings from the field and sends commands back to it, the HMI screens your operators watch, and the PLCs and RTUs at well pads and compressor stations, which are the small industrial computers that open valves, run pumps and report flow and tank levels.

OT was designed to be reliable, not secure. Much of it was installed on the assumption that nobody untrusted could ever reach it. For a smaller operator, that assumption rarely holds anymore. The historian, which is the server that stores production data over time, feeds reports to the office. Field data comes back over cellular modems. An automation contractor keeps a remote access tool installed so they can fix a problem at 2 a.m. without driving out to the site.

So the very first question in the first hour is not "who did this" or "how much do they want." It is this: from the office machines that are affected, could the attacker reach the SCADA server, the historian, or an engineering workstation? In many smaller companies the honest answer is "probably yes," because the office and the control room share one flat network, one set of administrator passwords and one Active Directory, which is the central directory that decides who can log in to what.

Your operations lead and your automation contractor are the people who can answer that question fastest, because they know how the field connects back. Call them early. If the control side is separated from the office by a firewall rule that only allows a few specific connections, you are in a much better position. If it is not, the conversation shifts to whether you can keep producing safely while the office is cleaned up. We cover the full picture of that boundary on our oil and gas cybersecurity page, and it is worth reading before you ever need it.

Who You Call, and in What Order

In the first hour, the order of phone calls matters more than any single technical step. Start with your operations lead, because the first business decision is whether field operations are affected and whether anything needs to be run manually or shut down safely. That is an operations call, not an IT call, and nobody outside your company should make it for you.

Next, call whoever handles your IT, whether that is one person on staff or an outside provider. Their job in this hour is not to fix anything. It is to tell you what they are seeing and to stop making changes until a plan is in place. Well-meaning IT staff often try to restore from backup or wipe an infected machine in the first thirty minutes, and that can destroy the very evidence you will need later.

Then call your cyber insurance carrier, if you have a policy. Most policies have a claims line and a list of approved response firms, and calling first protects your coverage. After that, call an incident response and forensics firm. If you are already working with one, they should be on the phone within the hour. If you are not, the carrier may assign one, or you can call us directly. We work with operators across Fort Worth, Dallas and the wider DFW area from our headquarters in McKinney, and most of the early work is done remotely, which means nobody has to wait for a truck to arrive.

Finally, decide who inside the company speaks for the business. Partners, vendors, royalty owners and employees will all start asking questions by the afternoon. One person, with one consistent message, prevents a lot of damage.

Preserve Before You Touch Anything

This is the step that most businesses skip, and it is the one that decides how the rest of the incident goes. Before anyone restores, reimages or "cleans up" a machine, the evidence on it needs to be preserved. That means copies of the affected systems, the logs from your firewall and VPN, which is the encrypted remote connection your staff and contractors use to get in from outside, and the sign-in records from email.

Why does this matter to an owner? Because every major decision you make in the next few weeks depends on knowing what the attacker actually reached. Whether you have to notify anyone under Texas law depends on it. What your insurer will pay depends on it. Digital forensics is the work of establishing exactly what an attacker accessed and when, in a way that will hold up when your insurer, your counsel or a regulator asks. If the evidence is wiped in the first hour, nobody can answer those questions later, and you are left assuming the worst.

Preservation does not mean leaving the attacker in place. Affected machines can be disconnected from the network while still powered on, so the evidence in memory is not lost. Accounts the attacker used can be disabled. Remote access can be cut off. The point is to contain without destroying.

One more thing belongs in this step. Find out how the attacker got in, because that door is usually still open. The well-documented Colonial Pipeline case is a useful example here. In May 2021, attackers got into Colonial's business network through a legacy VPN account that was no longer meant to be in use and had only a single password protecting it, with no second check. The company shut down its 5,500-mile refined products pipeline for about six days. The lesson for a smaller operator is not that nation-states are coming. It is that one forgotten remote access account without multi-factor authentication, which means a second check like a code on a phone in addition to the password, was enough. Once the business network was compromised, the company could not be confident its operations were safe. Contractor and vendor remote access accounts are exactly where to look first on your own network.

If a Payment Went to the Wrong Account

Sometimes the first sign of trouble is not locked files but money. Oil and gas money moves by invoice and wire in large, regular amounts, so an attacker who gets into one mailbox can learn your partners, your vendors and your payment calendar, and then send a convincing request with "updated remittance instructions" for a joint interest billing payment, which is the share of costs that non-operating working interest partners pay the operator, or for a routine invoice for trucking, water hauling or chemicals. This is called business email compromise, or BEC, meaning a criminal uses a real or lookalike email account to redirect a payment. If that has happened, call your bank immediately and ask for a recall, because same-day action is what gives recovery a chance, and then bring in a business email compromise response team to evict the attacker from the mailbox and establish what was read and sent. If the request came from a vendor's real address, our post on what to do when a supplier emails new bank details walks through the rest.

Which Rules Actually Apply to You After an Incident

Owners of smaller oil and gas companies are often told they are "regulated" without being told by what. Here is the short, accurate version as of November 2026. Confirm your own status with counsel, because this is a guide, not legal advice.

The TSA pipeline security directives, issued by the Transportation Security Administration after Colonial, are mandatory, but only for owners and operators of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines or LNG facilities that TSA has designated as critical and notified directly. The current version, SD Pipeline-2021-02G, took effect May 3, 2026 and runs through May 2, 2027. If TSA has not notified you, those directives do not bind you, although they are still a well-written picture of what good looks like.

NERC CIP, the Critical Infrastructure Protection standards for the electric grid, applies to companies registered with NERC that own or operate parts of the bulk electric system. An oil and gas company is in scope only if it has registered for one of those roles, for example because of on-site generation tied to the grid. The Railroad Commission of Texas regulates oil and gas operations, but we have not found a Commission rule that imposes specific cybersecurity controls on operators.

The rule that almost every operator does fall under is Texas breach notification. Texas Business and Commerce Code section 521.053 requires notice to affected individuals without unreasonable delay and no later than 60 days after you determine a breach occurred, and notice to the Texas Attorney General no later than 30 days after that determination if 250 or more Texans are affected. For an operator, remember the royalty and mineral owner records. Names paired with Social Security numbers are exactly the kind of data the statute covers, and an owner relations database can hold thousands of them. This is why the forensics step matters so much. The clock runs from when you determine a breach occurred, and the only way to know whether that owner database was touched is to have the evidence that shows it.

The Rest of the First Day and Keeping Production Moving

By the afternoon of the first day, the goal shifts from containment to a plan. Your response team should be able to tell you which systems are affected, how the attacker got in, whether there is any sign they reached the control side, and what has been done to shut them out.

The business decisions come next. Can field operations continue on their current footing while the office is rebuilt? Are your backups intact and separate from the systems that were hit? Recovering from clean backups is what shortens the outage, but only if the attacker could not reach them, so that needs to be confirmed before anything is restored.

Many smaller operators run IT with one or two people who are now working around the clock. That is often the moment owners realize the team needs backup, not replacement. Co-managed IT adds outside coverage alongside your own staff, so the people who know your systems best are not also the only people watching them at 3 a.m.

Once the immediate fire is out, the work that prevents the next one is usually unglamorous. It means a review of every remote access path into operations, including who has it, how it is protected and whether it is still needed. It means firewall rules between the business and control networks that allow only the connections that are truly required. And it means an outside vulnerability scan of everything your company exposes to the internet, including VPN gateways, remote access portals and field routers, because those are the doors attackers try first.

Getting Help in Fort Worth and Across North Texas

You do not have to sort any of this out alone, and you should not wait until the second day to call. We are an IT security and managed security firm headquartered in McKinney, working with operators across Fort Worth, Dallas and the rest of DFW, including companies that run Permian and other Texas field operations from their offices here. Our work focuses on the business side and the boundary to operations, which is where most attacks against operators actually start. If you are in Tarrant County, our Fort Worth cybersecurity page explains how we support local businesses, and our earlier post on the first 60 minutes of a ransomware attack in Fort Worth covers the first hour in more detail for any business.

If an incident is in progress right now, call us at 512-518-4408. If you want to know before anything happens whether your office network can reach your field equipment, start with a free security assessment, or contact our team to talk it through.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can ransomware on our office computers shut down our wells or pipeline?

It can if the office network can reach the control network, which is common in smaller companies that share one network and one set of passwords. Even when the attacker never touches field equipment, a company may choose to shut down because it cannot be sure its operations are safe, as Colonial Pipeline did in 2021. Knowing exactly what can reach your control systems is what lets you keep producing while the office is cleaned up.

Who should an oil and gas company call first after a cyber attack?

Call your operations lead first to decide whether field operations need to change, then your IT person or provider, then your cyber insurance carrier, and then an incident response and forensics firm. Ask your IT staff not to wipe or restore anything until evidence is preserved.

Do we have to report a cyber attack to the Railroad Commission of Texas?

We have not found a Railroad Commission rule that imposes specific cybersecurity controls on operators, so the rule most operators actually fall under is Texas breach notification. If personal information such as royalty owner names and Social Security numbers was accessed, affected individuals must be notified within 60 days, and the Texas Attorney General within 30 days when 250 or more Texans are affected. Confirm your own obligations with counsel.

Why should we preserve evidence instead of just restoring from backup?

Because the evidence is the only way to prove what the attacker reached, and that decides whether you must notify anyone, what your insurer will pay and how you answer partners. Restoring first erases that record and often leaves the original way in still open. Affected machines can be disconnected without being wiped, so you can contain the attack and keep the evidence at the same time.

Will an incident response team need to touch our SCADA or field equipment?

Not usually. A responsible IT security team works on the business network and the boundary to operations, and does not scan or change live control equipment, because fragile field devices can misbehave under ordinary network traffic. Anything that touches the control side should be agreed with your operations staff and your automation contractor first.

Happening right now?

Business email taken over, or a payment sent to the wrong account?

Call us now. The first hours matter most: your bank may still be able to recall the payment, and whoever is in the mailbox keeps access until it is locked down. We handle the lockout and help trace the payment.

Not an emergency? Get a free security assessment instead.

M

Mark Sullivan

Innovation Network Design

With nearly a decade in cybersecurity and IT infrastructure, our team delivers expert insights to help businesses in McKinney, Dallas, and across DFW make informed security decisions. Have a question? Get in touch.

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